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It is conventionally believed that neutral legal principles required antislavery judges to 
uphold proslavery legislation in spite of their moral convictions against slavery.  Under this 
view, an antislavery judge who ruled on proslavery legislation was forced to choose, not between 
liberty and slavery, but rather between liberty and fidelity to his conception of the judicial role in 
a system of limited government. 1  Focusing on the proslavery Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, this 
                                                 
1 The conventional view is comprehensively presented in: Robert Cover, Justice Accused: 
Antislavery and the Judicial Process (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975).  This view, 
however, has not gone completely unchallenged.  Several book reviews have suggested that 
Cover may have overstated the antislavery character of antebellum judges or that the judges’ 
claims that they lacked legal discretion to rule against proslavery laws may have been self-
serving justifications rather than the actual motivation behind their decisions.  See Redmond J. 
Barnett, “Review: Professionalism and the Chains of Slavery,” Mich. L. Rev.  77 (1979), 673-74; 
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paper challenges the conventional view by arguing that the constitutionality of the fugitive act 
was ambiguous---meaning that neutral legal principles supported a ruling against the fugitive act 
as well as a ruling in favor of it---and prominent antislavery judges were influenced to uphold the 
act by a belief that doing so was necessary in order to preserve the Union. 
Three lines of argument support this thesis.  First, the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, the 
primary proslavery law cited by the conventional view and perhaps the most important 
proslavery law brought before northern judges, was a crucial element of a fragile sectional 
compromise that was widely perceived to be an essential condition of the Union.  The judges 
were thus no doubt aware that a ruling against the act would have serious political consequences.  
Second, the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 was not clearly constitutional under either constitutional 
theory or existing legal precedent.  Any judge predisposed to render an antislavery ruling would 
therefore have had ample opportunity to do so without violating formal legal principles.  Third, 
                                                 
Don E. Fehrenbacher, “Review: Proslavery Law and Antislavery Judges,” Reviews in American 
History, 3 (1975), 454-55; Mark Tushnet, “Review,” Journal of American Legal History, 20 
(1975), 169.  However, no one has yet offered a developed argument against Cover’s thesis, 
which seems to have been accepted by most academics in both law and history.  See, e.g., Paul 
Finkelman, “Fugitive Slaves, Midwestern Racial Tolerance, and the Value of ‘Justice Delayed’” 
Iowa L. Rev. 78 (1992), 89; Earl M. Maltz, “Slavery, Federalism, and the Structure of the 
Constitution,” The American Journal of Legal History 36 (1992), 495; Martha Strassberg, 
“Taking Ethics Seriously: Beyond Positivist Jurisprudence in Legal Ethics,” Iowa L. Rev. 80 
(1995), 901; Stuart Streichler, Justice Curtis in the Civil War Era (Charlottesville: University of 
Virginia Press, 2005), 41. 
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the most prominent antislavery judges to rule on the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 as a matter of 
first impression, Justice John Mclean and Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw of the Supreme Judicial 
Court of Massachusetts, likely supported it as a necessary expedient to save the Union despite 
their personal feelings against slavery in the abstract.  In fact, these judges strained to rule 
against alleged fugitive slaves on factual and procedural grounds in addition to their proslavery 
constitutional rulings.  Political forces external to judging, legal considerations, and the judges’ 
personal beliefs thus all support the claim that policy considerations influenced the judges’ 
proslavery decisions. 
The conventional view is correct in that antislavery jurists justified their decisions by 
appealing to judicial positivism--they claimed that the positive law, which trumped morality and 
natural law, dictated a proslavery result.  Judicial positivism, however, probably served as an ex-
post justification rather than as an ex-ante motivation for their decisions.  The judges had 
obvious incentives to disclaim any opportunity to render an antislavery opinion, and, even if the 
judges actually believed that they were constrained by positive law, they in fact had the 
discretion to rule against the Fugitive Slave Act using formal legal principles.  Their decisions to 
uphold the act were thus at least somewhat shaped by policy considerations, though perhaps 
unconsciously.  It therefore seems that, even for judges who viewed slavery as morally 
reprehensible, the political explosiveness of the slavery issue at mid century fostered proslavery 
decisions. 
Understanding the judges’ inclinations regarding the Fugitive Slave Act should change 
the way we view the American antislavery judge.  Perhaps reading present day morals into the 
past, the conventional view assumes that antislavery judges were unwaveringly opposed to 
slavery and proslavery legislation in moral terms.  When viewed in light of the judges’ other 
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slavery decisions, however, a different picture emerges.  The same judges who upheld the 
proslavery fugitive act also ruled in favor of freeing slaves voluntarily brought into the North and 
banning slavery from the territories.  Like the moderate political actors of the antebellum era, 
antislavery judges were likely only inclined to support those antislavery positions that they felt 
would not endanger the Union. 
I. Political Context 
In order to appreciate why antislavery judges supported the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 as a 
matter of policy, it is necessary to first understand the political context in which they operated.  
By the late 1840s the economic issues that had played a prominent role in earlier national party 
struggles had given way to new and more pressing sectional concerns.2  Following the 
acquisition of new territory during the Mexican War, David Wilmot, in his famous Wilmot 
Proviso, moved that slavery be banned from all newly acquired lands.  This proviso, which 
gained the support of most northerners in Congress, was seen as “an insult to the South” and an 
official condemnation of southern institutions as morally undeserving.3  Southerners also worried 
that if the national government could use moral condemnation of slavery and disapproval of the 
                                                 
2 See William J. Cooper, The South and the Politics of Slavery: 1828-1856, (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1978), 229-30. 
3 1 William W. Freehling, Road to Disunion, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 461 
(quoting Alexander Stevens). 
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anti-republican “slavepower” to contain slaveholders in the South, they could use the same 
justifications to attack slavery itself once expansion had increased northern political power.4 
In addition to the territorial controversy, Southerners demanded a new fugitive slave law, 
as it was widely believed that the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 was a dead letter in the North.  The 
Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 authorized state magistrates and federal judges to issue certificates 
that authorized the removal of alleged fugitive slaves back to the South.5  In the 1842 case of 
Prigg v. Pennsylvania, however, Justice Joseph Story, in what has been treated as the opinion of 
the Court, held that the federal government was granted exclusive power under the Fugitive 
Slave Clause and cast serious doubt on whether Congress could force state officers to enforce the 
act.6  Some northern states exploited Justice Story’s dicta by passing personal liberty laws, which 
prohibited state officers from enforcing the Fugitive Slave Act and withdrew all other state 
assistance, such as the use of state jails, in the rendition of fugitive slaves.7  Because there were 
relatively few U.S. marshals and federal judges available to enforce the law, the withdrawal of 
state enforcement left it virtually nullified. 
When the national political parties failed to resolve these sectional issues, southern 
leaders called for action.  In Congress, Senator John C. Calhoun wrote an Address to the People 
                                                 
4 Ibid., 461-62.  The “slavepower” was seen as anti-republican because slaveholding states had 
more political power than their white population would dictate. 
5 Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, 2 Stat. 302-05 (1793). 
6 41 U.S. 539 (1842), 615-22.   
7 See Thomas D. Morris, Free Men All (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1974), 109, 
127. 
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of the Southern States, which listed northern transgressions against southern rights and called on 
the South to unite.  Although the address was unable to gain the support of southern Whigs,8 
many southern states adopted ominous resolutions threatening action if the Wilmot Proviso 
passed Congress.  In addition, a southern convention was called in Nashville “to devise and 
adopt some mode of resistance to [northern]… aggressions.”9  Before Congress convened in 
1850, southern editorials, mass meetings, and congressmen all warned of the possibility of 
disunion if the sectional issues were not resolved.10  According to historian David M. Potter, 
“most public men were deeply impressed by the gravity of the crisis.”11 
The Compromise of 1850, first proposed by Senator Henry Clay, emerged as a sweeping 
compromise that was designed to provide a final resolution to the sectional controversy.12  The 
territorial concerns were addressed by immediately admitting California as a state on her own 
terms, which meant without slavery,13 and establishing territorial governments in the rest of the 
                                                 
8 Whigs were suspicious of Calhoun’s motives and thought that newly elected Whig President 
Zachary Taylor could resolve the crisis.  David M. Potter, Impending Crisis (New York: Harper 
& Row, 1976), 85-86. 
9 Morris, Free Men All, 130 (citing The Growth of Southern Nationalism). 
10 Potter, Impending Crisis, 96. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid., 97. 
13 California was admitted under an antislavery constitution that had already been presented to 
Congress without going through a territorial phase. 
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Mexican Cession without the Wilmot Proviso.14  The South thus won a symbolic victory by 
avoiding the humiliation of the Wilmot Proviso, but, since southern California was the only area 
hospitable to slavery, this proposal was practically a concession to the North.15  Next, most of the 
disputed territory in the slave state of Texas was given to the New Mexico Territory, and the 
slave trade in the District of Columbia was abolished, both of which also obviously favored the 
North. 
The major concession demanded by the South was a new and more effective fugitive 
slave law.  Northern moderates understood that a southern victory on the fugitive slave issue was 
needed to induce southern moderates to accept the Compromise and undermine the position of 
southern disunionists.16  The South was thus essentially permitted to draft a bill of its own 
choosing, and the Fugitive Slave Act 1850 emerged as a strongly pro-southern bill designed to 
aid southerners in the reclamation of fugitives despite the inaction of northern states.17   
Although the Compromise of 1850 forestalled the threat of southern secession, 
enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Act was widely perceived to be a necessary condition of 
Union.  President Millard Fillmore pledged “to bring the whole force of the government” to 
enforce the Fugitive Slave Act in the North, which he saw as a means to undermine southern 
                                                 
14 The status of slavery was otherwise left ambiguous.  It was unclear whether, as northern 
Democrats claimed, voters in the territories could ban slavery, or, as southerners argued, slavery 
was mandatory until the territory was admitted as a state. 
15 Potter, Impending Crisis, 99-100. 
16 Freehling, Road to Disunion, 486. 
17 The content of the Fugitive Slave Act will be discussed in detail below in Section II (i). 
  8 
support for disunion and set a precedent of using national force to deter secessionists.18  In the 
South, both parties endorsed the Georgia Platform, which pledged that the South “would abide 
by [the Compromise of 1850] as a permanent adjustment of this sectional controversy” and 
would resist, even to the point of secession, any attempt to alter it.  Its final resolution ominously 
warned that “upon a faithful execution of the Fugitive Slave Law by the proper authorities 
depends the preservation of our much beloved Union.”19   
II. The Constitutionality of the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 
The conventional account of the antislavery judge largely disregards the political importance 
of the Fugitive Slave Act and assumes that it was clearly constitutional under existing 
precedent.20  Under this view, antislavery legal arguments relied on natural law--legal principles 
based on morality--and conflicted with formal legal principles such as judicial precedent and 
                                                 
18 Michael F. Holt, The Rise and Fall of the American Whig Party (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1999), 598 (quoting Fillmore).   
19 Ibid., 614.  Proving that such views were shared by the judiciary, Supreme Court Justice 
Samuel Nelson warned: “My deep conviction and belief are, that [the Union] depends, at this 
moment, upon the confidence inspired by the late proceedings in congress, and by the indications 
of public sentiment in the free states that this constitutional obligation [to return fugitive slaves] 
will be hereafter executed in the faith and spirit with which it was entered into . . . .”  In re 
Charge to the Grand Jury, 30 F. Cas. 1007 (S.D.N.Y. 1851), 1012. 
20 Cover, Justice Accused, 207 (stating that the constitutionality of the fugitive slave acts was 
“well-established by the 1850’s”). 
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statutory and constitutional interpretation.21  These formal legal principles were critical to the 
nineteenth century conception of the judicial role, as the unelected judiciary had long justified 
judicial review of the political branches by arguing that formal legal principles constrained 
judicial discretion.22  Under this conventional view, because antislavery arguments violated 
formal legal principles, antislavery judges were forced to choose between their moral convictions 
against slavery and fidelity to their conception of the judicial role in a system of limited 
government.23 
At least with respect to the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, however, judges who ruled as a 
matter of first impression were not faced with such a decision.24  Although antislavery judges 
claimed that formal legal considerations forced them to uphold the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, 
this simply was not true.  Most modern scholars agree that strong arguments existed both for and 
against the constitutionality of the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850.25  This paper does not attempt to 
                                                 
21 Ibid. 197-98, 131-148. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid.  Cover further explains that “the legal actor did not choose between liberty and slavery.  
He had to choose between liberty and ordered federalism; between liberty and consistent limits 
on the judicial function; between liberty and fidelity to public trust; between liberty and 
adherence to the public corporate undertakings of nationhood; or, as some of the judges would 
have it, between liberty and the viability of the social compact.”  Ibid., 198. 
24 After circuit courts upheld the law, however, federal district judges were bound to follow suit. 
25 See Stanley W. Campbell, The Slave Catchers (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 1970); Don E. Fehrenbacher, The Slaveholding Republic: An Account of the United States 
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render a conclusive determination of the act’s validity; rather, it only seeks to establish that the 
act’s constitutionality was open to legitimate debate within a traditional legal framework. 
i. Content of the Fugitive Slave Act  
The Fugitive Slave Act’s questionable constitutionality resulted from its strongly pro-
Southern content.  The fugitive act was passed as part of the Compromise of 1850, but it was not 
a compromise on the issue of fugitive slaves.  Specifically, the act authorized slave owners or 
their agents to forcefully seize alleged fugitives and return them to the state from which they fled 
with or without legal process.26  If the slave owner wished to utilize federal procedures, a 
southern judge could issue a certificate that would conclusively establish the slave status of the 
person mentioned therein for purposes of removal.27   This certificate could be presented to a 
federal judge or commissioner in the North who would issue a warrant for the fugitive’s arrest.  
Anyone who interfered with the arrest of a fugitive, attempted to rescue him, assisted the 
                                                 
Government's Relations to Slavery (New York : Oxford University Press, 2002), 240; Morris, 
Free Men All; Streichler, Justice Curtis, 4.  But see Cover, Justice Accused, 207; Allen Johnson, 
“The Constitutionality of the Fugitive Slave Law,” Yale L. J. 31 (1921): 161-182.  Alfred 
Brophy has argued that Allen Johnson’s article, the most comprehensive academic writing in 
support of the constitutionality of the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, was part of the early twentieth 
century movement to reargue the South’s cause in order to promote reconciliation between the 
North and South rather than a scholarly examination of the constitutional theories of the 1850s.  
See Alfred Brophy, “Jim Crow History in the Yale Law Journal,” (unpublished manuscript). 
26 Ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462, 463 (1850) (repealed 1864). 
27 Ibid., 465.   
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fugitive’s escape, or concealed a fugitive was subject to a fine not exceeding one thousand 
dollars and imprisonment not exceeding six months.28   
Once arrested, the alleged fugitive slave faced proceedings before a federal 
commissioner.29  The commissioner was paid five dollars if the alleged fugitive was found to be 
free and ten if found to be a slave.30  Under no circumstances was the testimony of the alleged 
fugitive to be admitted, and the fugitive was denied the right to a trial by jury.31  Finally, the 
proceedings were deemed summary and final--no appeal or writ of habeas corpus was 
permitted.32  The act thus armed the southern claimant with new procedures designed to aid in 
rendition and, in response to many northern states’ withdrawal of cooperation, greatly increased 
the federal government’s involvement by utilizing federal commissioners instead of relying on 
state magistrates. 
ii. Constitutional Theory and the Fugitive Slave Act 
Antislavery advocates attacked the Fugitive Slave Act with at least three major lines of 
argument.  First, the antislavery bar argued that Congress was granted no power to legislate on 
                                                 
28 Ibid., 464. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid., 463-64. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid., 462.   
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the subject of fugitive slaves.33  Under this argument, the Fugitive Slave Clause of the 
Constitution was merely an obligation between the states.  The clause stated: “No person held to 
service or labor in one state, under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence 
of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from any service or labor; but shall be delivered 
up on claim of the party, to whom such service or labor may be due.”34  This clause obviously 
gave no explicit grant of power to Congress.  Moreover, the clause is found not in Article I, 
which enumerates congressional power, but rather in Section 2 of Article IV, which is a series of 
interstate comity provisions.  Finally, since the framers explicitly granted Congress enforcement 
power in other sections of Article IV, it could be inferred that the lack of such an explicit grant of 
power in the Fugitive Slave Clause was intentional.   
 The second major line of argument against the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 was 
that it violated various provisions of the Bill of Rights, including the rights to a trial by 
jury and due process of law.35  These arguments focused on the rights of free blacks in 
the North.  Because northerners were generally presumed to be free and Bill of Rights 
                                                 
33 See, e.g., Fehrenbacher, Slaveholding Republic, 240-41; Salmon Chase, An Argument for the 
Defendant in the Case of Wharton Jones v. John VanZandt (Cincinnati, 1847), 96-102; Robert 
Rantoul, Jr., Memoirs, Speeches and Writings (Luther Hamilton, ed., Boston, 1854), 55-58. 
34 U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3. 
35 See, e.g., Chase, An Argument for the Defendant 93; Lysander Spooner, A Defense for 
Fugitive Slaves, Against the Act of Congress of February 12, 1793, and September 18, 1850 
(Boston, 1850), 6-9, 27-43. 
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protections applied to all “persons,” rather than being limited to citizens, free blacks were 
at least arguably entitled to constitutional protections.36 
Of particular importance, antislavery lawyers often argued that the variable fee 
paid to commissioners, which was doubled when the commissioner ruled against the 
alleged fugitive, constituted a bribe and thus violated due process of law.37  Supreme 
Court Justice John McLean, among others, argued in response that commissioners were 
paid a higher fee when a fugitive was removed merely “as a compensation to the 
                                                 
36 See, e.g., Chase, An Argument for the Defendant, 89; Trial of Thomas Sims, on an Issue of 
Personal Liberty, on the Claim of James Potter, of Georgia, Against Him, as an Alleged Fugitive 
From Service: Arguments of Robert Rantoul, Jr. and Charles G. Loring, with the Decision of 
George T. Curtis (Boston: WM. S. Damrell & Co., 1851), 34-36 (argument of Charles Loring). 
37 See Lewis Tappan, The Fugitive Slave Bill: Its History and Unconstitutionality; With an 
Account of the Seizure and Enslavement of James Hamlet (New York: William Harned, 1850), 
21; “Trial of Henry W. Allen, U.S. Deputy Marshal, For Kidnapping, With Arguments of 
Counsel & Charge of Justice Marvin, on the Constitutionality of the Fugitive Slave Law” 
(Syracuse: Power Press of the Daily Journal Office, 1852), 18 (printing the argument of Gerrit 
Smith),  in 1 Fugitive Slaves in American Courts: The Pamphlet Literature, ed. Paul Finkelman, 
(New York & London: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1988), 222; 2 Charles Sumner, Orations and 
Speeches (Boston 1892), 402; Trial of Thomas Sims, 25 (argument of Charles Loring); “Fugitive 
Slave Law,” The Liberator (Boston, Oct. 11, 1850); Miller v. McQuerry, 17 F. Cass. 335 (1853), 
339 (discussing the arguments of counsel). 
  14 
commissioner” for the extra time needed to write a certificate of removal.38  In fact, 
judges in England and the states were routinely compensated with fee arrangements.39   
The antislavery argument against variable compensation, however, cannot be 
dismissed as completely outlandish.  Judicial fees in England and the states were 
ordinarily triggered at various stages throughout the course of litigation, such as when the 
court served a summons or empanelled a jury, rather than being dependant on ruling in 
favor of a particular party.40  Moreover, English common law cases, which were routinely 
                                                 
38 Miller, 339.  Commissioner George T. Curtis, however, ruled that the fee arrangement was 
permissible if the commissioner chose not to accept the higher fee, as accepting the fee was not 
mandatory.  Trial of Thomas Sims, 39. 
39 James E. Pfander, “Judicial Compensation and the Definition of Judicial Power in the Early 
Republic,” 107 Mich. L. Rev. (2008), 8; Daniel Klerman, “Jurisdictional Competition and the 
Evolution of the Common Law,” 74 U. Chi. L. R. (2007), 1187; Thomas K. Urdahl, The Fee 
System in the United States (Madison, Wis., Democrat Printing Co., 1898), 145, 151-52.  The 
constitutionality of awarding fees to federal judges of “inferior courts,” however, was 
questionable under Article III.   In fact, the Process Act, a federal statute that compensated 
federal judicial officers the same as corresponding state judges, specifically excluded fees.  
Pfander, “Judicial Compensation,” 14-19, 19 n.125, 133. 
40 See Pfander, “Judicial Compensation,” 8, n.32 (describing early British and colonial fee 
systems); Klerman, “Jurisdictional Competition,” 1187-88 (same); see also Tumey v. Ohio, 273 
U.S. 510 (1926), 524, 531 (“We have been referred to no cases at common law in England prior 
to the separation of colonies from the mother country showing a practice that inferior judicial 
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used to interpret provisions of the Bill of Rights,41 held that it was impermissible for a 
judge to have a financial interest in a case he was deciding, even if that stake was de 
minimus.42  Although commissioners were required to perform more work when 
remanding a fugitive, the higher fee still posed a risk of bias. 
The third major argument against the Fugitive Slave Act, and perhaps the most 
strenuously argued and persuasive argument put forth by the antislavery bar, was that the act 
permitted Article III cases to be adjudicated by non-Article III judges.43  Federal commissioners 
                                                 
officers were dependent upon the conviction of the defendant for receiving their 
compensation.”). 
41 Murray’s Lessee v. Hobokin Land and Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272 (1855), 277. 
42 See, e.g., Hesketh v. Braddock, 3 Burr. 1847 (1766), 1856 (“There is no principle the in law 
more settled than this--that any degree, even the smallest degree of interest in the question 
depending, is a decisive objection to a witness, and much more to a juror, or to an officer to 
whom the jury is returned. . . . The minuteness of the interest will not relax the objection.  For, 
the degrees of influence cannot be measured: no line can be drawn, but that of a total exclusion 
of all degrees whatsoever.”).  Although I have been unable to find a record of antislavery 
advocates citing to such common law cases, these cases were available during the 1850s. 
43 See, e.g., Rantoul, Memoirs, Speeches and Writings, 51-53; Trial of Thomas Sims, 1-14, 25-
34 (arguments of Robert Ranoul and Charles Loring); Tappan, The Fugitive Slave Bill, 28;  
Spooner, A Defense for Fugitive Slaves, 9-17; “Habeas Corpus Trial,” Daily Free Democrat 
(Milwaukee, Wis.), June, 7, 1854 (printing the argument of Byron Paine, counsel for the 
defendant in the case that culminated in Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. 506 (1859)). 
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were empowered to decide cases under the fugitive act and thus arguably exercised federal 
judicial power.  The Constitution requires Article III judges to “hold their Offices during good 
Behaviour, and . . . receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished 
during their Continuance in Office.”44  Because the commissioners were appointed by federal 
circuit courts, did not have lifetime tenure, and were paid a variable salary, the constitutional 
validity of their new powers was questionable.  
This argument seems plausible as well.  Prior to the Fugitive Slave Act, federal 
commissioners were authorized only to set bail, take affidavits and depositions, and arrest and 
imprison suspected violators of federal law while awaiting trial--they were not empowered to 
render final decisions in federal cases.45  The commissioners’ new powers were questionable, as 
fugitive hearings arguably invoked federal judicial power and the Constitution requires such 
power to be vested only in federal judges.  Article III dictates that “the judicial power of the 
United States, shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and such inferior courts as Congress may . . 
. establish,”46 and Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee explicitly holds that Article III requires all federal 
                                                 
44 U.S. Const. art. III, § 1. 
45 See Charles A. Lindquist, “The Origin and Development of the United States Commissioner 
System,” 14 Am. J. Legal Hist. (1970), 6-8;  An Act in addition to an act , entitled “An act for 
the more convenient taking of affidavits and bail in civil causes, depending in the courts of the 
United States” 3 Stat. 350 (1817);  An Act further supplementary to an act entitled, “An act to 
establish the judicial courts of the United States,” 5 Stat. 516 (1842). 
46 U.S. Const. art. III, § 1 (emphasis added).   
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judicial power to be vested in a federal court.47  As antislavery lawyers argued, Justice Story 
asserted in Prigg that fugitive slave hearings constituted cases “within the express delegation of 
[federal] judicial power.”48  Antislavery advocates thus argued that because fugitive hearings 
were a part of the federal judicial power, the Constitution required them to be heard by, or 
                                                 
47 14 U.S. 304 (1816), 331 (“The whole judicial power of the United States should be, at all 
times, vested either in an original or appellate form, in some courts created under its authority.”).  
For antislavery use of this argument, see Thomas H. Talbot, The Constitutional Provision 
Respecting Fugitives From Service or Labor, and the Act of Congress, of September 18, 1850 
(Boston, 1852), 78; Trial of Thomas Sims, 1, 15, 26 (arguments of Robert Rantoul and Charles 
Loring). 
48 Prigg, 616; Spooner, A Defense for Fugitive Slaves, 9; Talbot, Fugitives From Service or 
Labor, 77-78, 105; Trial of Thomas Sims, 4-5, 34 (arguments of Robert Rantoul and Charles 
Loring).  In addition to Justice Story’s declaration in Prigg, it seems plausible to think that 
commissioners in fugitive slave hearings exercised federal judicial power under the test 
announced in Murray’s Lessee v. Hobokin Land and Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272 (1855).  In 
Murray’s Lessee, the court held:  “we do not consider congress can either withdraw from judicial 
cognizance any matter which, from its nature, is the subject of a suit at the common law, or in 
equity, or admiralty; nor, on the other hand, can it bring under the judicial power a matter which, 
from its nature, is not a subject for judicial determination.”  Ibid., 284.  In Jones v. Van Zandt, 
the Supreme Court stated that the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 “was only carrying out, in our 
confederate form of government, the clear right of every man at common law to make fresh suit 
and recapture of his own property within the realm.”  46 U.S. 215 (1847), 229 (emphasis added). 
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appealable to, a federal judge meeting the requirements of Article III. 49   Since the 
commissioners’ decisions could not be appealed or otherwise reviewed, their new powers were 
arguably unconstitutional. 
 Defenders of the act replied to the last two objections by claiming that hearings 
before federal commissioners were preliminary, ministerial, and thus analogous to the 
initial seizure of a fugitive from justice.50  Under this argument, commissioners did not 
make final decisions regarding the alleged fugitives’ status; instead, they merely 
                                                 
49 See Spooner, A Defense for Fugitive Slaves, 15; Talbot, Fugitives From Service or Labor, 77-
84; Trial of Thomas Sims, 5-6 (argument of Robert Rantoul).  Although other federal officers, 
such as federal marshals, may have exercised quasi-judicial powers, their actions were reviewed 
by, or appealable to, a federal court.  Federal judicial power was thus vested in the court to which 
the decision was appealed, just as state decisions involving a federal question could ultimately be 
appealed to the Supreme Court. 
50 See, e.g., Fehrenbacher, Slaveholding Republic, 242-43; Miller v. McQuerry, 17 F. Cass. 335 
(1853) (McLean, J.); “The Fugitive Slave Law,” Boston Daily Advertiser, Nov. 2, 1850 (printing 
an exchange between Charles Gibbons and Supreme Court Justice Robert Grier); In re Charge to 
the Grand Jury, 1011 (Nelson, J.); “The Constitutionality of the Fugitive Slave Law,” Boston 
Daily Advertiser, Nov. 19, 1850 (printing a speech of Benjamin Curtis, a lawyer who would be 
appointed to the Supreme Court in 1851); “Argument of George Comstock in the Kidnapping 
Case at Syracuse, upon the Constitutionality of the Fugitive Slave Law” (Syracuse 1852) 11, in 2 
Fugitive Slaves in American Courts, 336; Trial of Thomas Sims, 42 (opinion of Commissioner 
George T. Curtis). 
  19 
authorized the extradition of alleged fugitives back to the state from which they fled, 
where a southern court could make a final determination.  Since the hearing was 
ministerial, the right of trial by jury did not apply, the process due was minimal, and 
commissioners did not exercise final federal judicial power. 51 
This response, however, was by no means conclusive.  The decision of the 
commissioner was final in a way that extradition of a fugitive from justice was not.  
Whereas extradition of a fugitive from justice was merely the first step in a 
constitutionally regulated trial, the rendition of a fugitive slave was followed by no 
further legal proceedings, as the fugitive was remanded to the owner’s private custody as 
a slave.52  Moreover, the commissioner’s decision could not be appealed or questioned 
                                                 
51 Jury trials are required only in criminal trials and those at common law.  U.S. Const. amend. 
VI, VII.   
52 See, e.g., Asa Rand, The Slave-Catcher Caught in the Meshes of Eternal Law (Cleveland, 
1852), 24-25; “Trial of Henry W. Allen,” 14-16.  In the trial of Thomas Sims, Charles Loring 
described the commissioner’s decision as follows: “[T]he immediate result is, that you adjudge 
the captive to be a slave; that you adjudge that he belongs, as a slave, to this claimant; and that 
you order him to be delivered up directly to the claimant’s hands, as a slave--not delivered over 
to the officers of the law, but to the person claiming ownership, and of course delivered to him as 
owner . . . and without qualification or limitation of such right of ownership.”  In response, 
Commissioner George T. Curtis argued: “My view of it is this; that it is my duty, if satisfied, to 
make out a certificate, not certifying that he is a slave, but certifying what are the facts; First, that 
somebody escaped and owed service; and second, that this individual is the identical person.  But 
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under habeas corpus proceedings.53  As Thomas H. Talbot argued, the commissioner’s 
hearing was “preliminary to no other proceeding, ancillary to no other trial, [and] 
ministerial to no other court.”54  Moreover, unlike a fugitive from justice, the act 
authorized the removal of a person “held to service or labor” rather than a person charged 
with being held to service, implying that the fugitive hearing determined the alleged 
fugitive’s status.55  In fact, the only possible future proceeding--a suit brought by the 
                                                 
there is a difference between that and certifying that a man is a slave.”  Trial of Thomas Sims, 
28. 
53 Ch. 60, 9 Stat. at 464. 
54 Talbot, Fugitives From Service or Labor, 52. Talbot further explained that, for a proceeding to 
be preliminary, “[t]he officer must know what the tribunal is, before which the final proceeding 
is to be had; and his decision, or whatever act or paper closes the proceeding before him, must 
recognize that tribunal, and his relation to it.”  Ibid., 43.  Similarly, Robert Rantoul argued that 
“the decision of the commissioner is final on this question; his decree is the last act of judicial 
power.”  Sims’s Case, 61 Mass. 285 (1851) (printing Rantoul’s argument for the defendant).   
55 Rantoul, Memoirs, Speeches and Writings, 53; Trial of Thomas Sims, 8 (argument of Robert 
Rantoul); Horace Mann, Slavery: Letters and Speeches (Boston, 1851), 308.  As antislavery 
advocates pointed out, this argument especially seems to refute any argument that the 
commissioner’s decision was limited or preliminary when combined with the Supreme Court’s 
determination in Prigg, discussed below, that a master’s rights over his fugitive slave are 
absolute and unqualified, even while the parties are still in transit to the state from which the 
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alleged slave for his freedom in the South--would seem to be a wholly separate trial, 
much like a prisoner bringing a habeas corpus petition.56  The commissioner’s decision 
was thus arguably both final and judicial, and thus in violation of Article III and the Bill 
of Rights.57  
iii. Legal Precedent  
Although several plausible constitutional arguments against the fugitive acts were 
available, antislavery judges did not review the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 on a clean slate, and 
it is thus necessary to consider whether legal precedent may have constrained their decisions.  
Prigg v. Pennsylvania was the leading case on the subject of fugitive slaves.  In Prigg, the jury 
found by special verdict that Edward Prigg had removed Margaret Morgan and her children from 
Pennsylvania as fugitive slaves without complying with the removal provisions of 
Pennsylvania’s personal liberty law, which established procedures for the recovery of fugitive 
                                                 
fugitive fled.  See Talbot, Fugitives From Service or Labor, 41-42, 107; Trial of Thomas Sims, 
31 (argument of Charles Loring). 
56 Talbot, Fugitives From Service or Labor, 48-49; Trial of Thomas Sims, 9 (argument of Robert 
Rantoul).   
57 It is interesting to note that, during the debates over the Fugitive Slave Act, Senator Joseph R. 
Underwood of Kentucky asked: if there is no requirement for a trial by jury in the South, “may it 
not be urged by our northern friends that the examination shall be made abroad, where the 
fugitive is arrested?”  Cong. Globe, 31st Cong., 1st Sess. App. 1611 (1850).  This seems to imply 
that Senator Underwood believed that the hearings under the fugitive act were a final judicial 
determination of the alleged fugitive’s status. 
  22 
slaves and punished the kidnapping of black residents.58  The jury also specifically found that 
Margaret Morgan was in fact a fugitive slave.59  Relying on these findings, the Pennsylvanian 
courts found that Prigg was guilty of kidnapping under Pennsylvania’s personal liberty law 
because he had failed to comply with its removal procedures. 
On appeal to the Supreme Court, Justice Joseph Story, in what has been treated as the 
opinion of the Court, ruled that it was unconstitutional for Pennsylvania to punish a master for 
recovering his fugitive slaves.60  Justice Story’s ruling was based on two lines of argument.  
First, Story held that the Constitution secures a master’s private right of recaption, which 
empowers a master “in every State of the Union, to seize and recapture his slave, whenever he 
can do it, without any breach of the peace or illegal violence.” 61  Story further found that “any 
state law or state regulation, which interrupts, limits, delays or postpones the right of the owner 
to the immediate possession of the slave” conflicts with the master’s right of private recaption. 62  
Because the Pennsylvanian courts had interpreted the state’s personal liberty law to require a 
master to comply with its procedures and thus punished Prigg for independently removing his 
                                                 
58 Prigg, 556-57. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid., 626.  Although there is some scholarly disagreement regarding whether Story spoke for a 
majority on all points, his opinion was treated as the Court’s by judges who subsequently looked 
to Prigg as precedent.  See Sims Case, 304-08 (Shaw, J.); Miller, 337-40 (McLean, J.). 
61 Prigg, 613. 
62 Ibid., 612. 
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fugitive slave, Story found that the personal liberty law conflicted with Prigg’s constitutional 
right of recaption.63 
The procedural posture of the case, however, drastically limited the implications of 
Prigg’s right of recaption.  In Prigg, the jury had already found that Margaret Morgan was in fact 
a fugitive slave, and thus the right arguably applied only to admitted fugitives.  Anything in 
Story’s opinion which suggested that states could not protect their free black residents was 
therefore dictum.  The right of recaption was thus arguably consistent with alleged fugitives 
having legal rights, such as due process and the right to a jury trial, when their status was in 
dispute.   
In Story’s second line of reasoning, he found that the federal Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 
preempted any state legislation on the subject of returning fugitive slaves, including 
Pennsylvania’s personal liberty law.64  In order to reach this conclusion, Story also held that the 
Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 was constitutional.65   
Prigg’s ruling in favor of the constitutionality of the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 clearly 
eliminated the first antislavery argument explained above--that Congress was granted no power 
under the Fugitive Slave Clause--and also called into question the applicability of Bill of Rights 
                                                 
63 Ibid., 625-26. 
64 41 U.S. 539, 617-18 (1842).   
65 Ibid., 622.  Story further held that Congress was granted exclusive power under the fugitive 
clause.  Ibid.  Federal exclusivity could be seen as Story’s third line reasoning, although it is not 
relevant to the topic of this paper.  
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protections.66  The Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 commanded a judge or magistrate to authorize the 
removal of a person claimed as a fugitive slave “upon proof to the satisfaction of such Judge or 
magistrate” that the person claimed was in fact a fugitive slave.67  Since the determination was 
made by the judge or magistrate, the act clearly did not contemplate a trial by jury, and thus 
Prigg seems to preclude one of the antislavery bar’s most popular arguments.  
However, the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 did not utilize federal commissioners or pay 
variable fees to federal officers, and thus, despite some argument to the contrary, no ruling on the 
1793 act could prejudice these two remaining antislavery arguments.  Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw 
of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, among others, argued that since Prigg upheld 
the use of state magistrates under the Fugitive Slave Law of 1793, it upheld the use of federal 
commissioners by analogy.68  He reasoned that although both positions were given similar quasi-
judicial powers, neither satisfied Article III standards.  Article III’s requirements, however, apply 
only to federal judges.  It thus could be argued that the Constitution requires Congress to either 
use state officers to enforce its laws or create federal judges with Article III protections.69  There 
                                                 
66 See Paul Finkleman, “Sorting Out Prigg v. Pennsylvania,” Rutgers L.J., 24 (1993), 630. 
67 Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, 2 Stat. 302 (1793). 
68 Sim’s Case, 61 Mass. 285 (1851), 304–08.  See also, In re Charge to the Grand Jury, 1011 
(Nelson J.); Trial of Thomas Sims, 42-43 (opinion of Commissioner Curtis). 
69 Although there was no precedent on this point in the 1850s, it is interesting to note that the 
modern Court would almost certainly find this argument persuasive under Northern Pipeline 
Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982). 
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was thus ample room for the argument that state officers were not strictly analogous to federal 
commissioners and therefore Prigg did not control the issue. 
iv. The Judicial Role in the Nineteenth Century 
 Although the constitutionality of the Fugitive Slave Act was ambiguous, it may be that 
nineteenth century constraints on the judiciary foreclosed a ruling against it.  As explained 
above, the traditional view is that the nineteenth century judiciary upheld proslavery legislation 
because it rejected antislavery arguments based on natural law or morality.70  However, even 
though antislavery advocates did frequently argue in terms of natural law,71 many of their 
arguments were based solely on positive law.  In fact, none of the three arguments set out above 
relies on natural law or rules of interpretation based on morality; instead, each utilizes only 
traditional legal sources such as constitutional text and interpretation.  The reluctance of 
eighteenth century jurists to accept natural rights arguments thus does not challenge the 
contention that the fugitive act was of questionable constitutionality. 
 Another possible judicial constraint was the prevailing conception of judicial review.   
According to conventional wisdom, by the mid-nineteenth century the Supreme Court had found 
only one act of Congress to be unconstitutional, and the law in question was merely a law 
                                                 
70 See above note 21 and surrounding text. 
71 See, e.g., “Argument of William H. Seward on the Laws of Congress Concerning the 
Recapture of Fugitive Slaves,” in 1 Fugitive Slaves in American Courts, 485.   
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regarding the Court’s own jurisdiction.72  It thus could be argued that the courts did not exercise 
meaningful review of federal legislation.73 
 In the first several decades of the Court’s existence, judicial review was a limited practice 
that bears little resemblance to the modern doctrine.  Judicial review was initially viewed by 
many as a political and revolutionary act that relied on fundamental principles of law that were 
embodied in the Constitution rather than the constitutional text itself.74  As a result of Chief 
Justice John Marshal’s interpretation of the Constitution as supreme written law, however, 
distinctions between ordinary law and the Constitution blurred.75  Judicial review of legislation 
thus became widely accepted and was often utilized against state legislation, though jurists 
generally restricted its scope to the “concededly unconstitutional act.”76  
                                                 
72 Larry D. Kramer, The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial Review 
(Oxford University Press, 2004), 213.  The Supreme Court’s exercise of judicial review was, of 
course, in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
73 See H. Robert Baker, The Rescue of Joshua Glover: A Fugitive Slave, the Constitution, and 
the Coming of the Civil War (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2006), 37, 56. 
74 Sylvia Snowiss, Judicial Review and the Law of the Constitution (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1990), 3-4. 
75 See Ibid, 3-6; Kramer, The People Themselves, 150. 
76 See Snowiss, Judicial Review, 6.  See also Kramer, The People Themselves, 150-54; 
Christopher Wolfe, The Rise of Modern Judicial Review (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, Inc., 1994).  Even this early limitation in scope did not completely eviscerate judicial 
review, however, since, as Chief Justice Marshall explained in Ogden v. Sanders, a law was 
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 The scope and perceived legitimacy of judicial review, however, expanded dramatically 
during the first half of the nineteenth century.77  The Court first moved beyond the concededly 
unconstitutional act in cases involving the Supremacy Clause and the Contract Clause.  In these 
cases, Chief Justice Marshal interpreted the constitutional text as ordinary law and enforced this 
interpretation even against plausible alternative interpretations made by state legislatures.78  At 
first, other justices on the Court joined in Chief Justice Marshal’s opinions only because they 
agreed with his ultimate holdings.  The justices used the legal doctrine of vested rights, which 
they viewed as fundamental law, to reach Chief Justice Marshal’s Contract Clause conclusions 
and agreed that the Court was given unique authority to resolve certain disputes with the states in 
the Supremacy Clause.79  Although the Court may have shown more deference to Congress than 
the states and tended to avoid politically divisive issues,80 by mid-century Chief Justice 
Marshal’s practices had begun to take root and the stage was set for meaningful judicial review 
outside the vested rights and federalism contexts.81 
                                                 
sometimes “in the opinion of one [judge], clearly consistent with the constitution, and, in the 
opinion of the other, as clearly repugnant to it.”  12 Wheaten 213 (1827), 339 (Marshal, J., 
dissenting). 
77 Barry Friedman, “The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One: The Road to 
Judicial Supremacy,” 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. (1998), 340, 431. 
78 See Snowiss, Judicial Review, 119; Kramer, The People Themselves, 177. 
79 See Snowiss, Judicial Review, 119, 161, 171.  
80 Kramer, The People Themselves, 150, 209. 
81 See Snowiss, Judicial Review, 119; 176-77.   
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Dred Scott v. Sanford, decided merely seven years after the passage of the Fugitive Slave 
Act, proves that judicial review was sufficiently robust by mid-century to allow judges with 
sufficient motivation to strike down constitutionally ambiguous federal legislation.  In Dred 
Scott, the Supreme Court ruled that federal legislation passed in the Missouri Compromise was 
unconstitutional.82  The judges who formed the proslavery majority certainly did not rule against 
a “concededly unconstitutional act,” as the decision has historically been condemned as 
unreasoned and even its modern defenders admit that the constitutional law involved was 
ambiguous.83  If judges who preferred a proslavery ruling could use ambiguous constitutional 
doctrine to strike down federal legislation in Dred Scott, then it is hard to understand why 
antislavery judges could not have done the same regarding the Fugitive Slave Act.   
The public reaction to Dred Scott is also revealing.  Although countless critics attacked 
the constitutional merits of the decision, few questioned the Court’s power to render it.84  Indeed, 
many of the decision’s supporters self-servingly asserted that the Court had the power to render a 
final interpretation of all constitutional issues that came before it.85  If the prevailing view in the 
legal community had been that judicial review of federal legislation was improper or only 
                                                 
82 60 U.S. 393 (1857). 
83 See, e.g., Mark A. Graber, Dred Scott and the Problem of Constitutional Evil (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006), 17, 76-77. 
84 Friedman, “Countermajoritarian Difficulty,” 417 n.343; Don E. Fehrenbacher, The Dred Scott 
Case: Its Significance in American Law and Politics (Oxford University Press, 1978), 419, 439-
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85 Fehrenbacher, The Dred Scott Case, 418. 
  29 
justified in extreme cases, this likely would have been a common criticism of the decision.  The 
lack of such criticism seems to imply that judicial review of congressional legislation, even 
constitutionally ambiguous and politically divisive legislation, was a generally accepted function 
of the judicial role at mid-century. 
Nor can Dred Scott merely be dismissed as an outlier.  The traditional account of judicial 
review of congressional legislation before the Civil War--that of nearly complete deference to 
Congress--has recently come under attack.86  This revisionist scholarship demonstrates not only 
that the Court invalidated several statutes prior to the 1850s,87 but, more importantly, the Court 
also regularly reviewed the constitutionality of federal legislation and often limited or rewrote 
statutes to avoid constitutional boundaries.88  Like the Court’s review of state legislation, most of 
these cases involved the institution of the judiciary or federalism issues; however, the Court’s 
review occasionally extended to matters relating to individual rights as well.89  Even though few 
statutes had been wholly invalidated on constitutional grounds, by the 1850s the Court had 
                                                 
86 See Keith E. Whittington, “Judicial Review of Congress Before the Civil War,” 97 
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power to interpret the Constitution and limit the legislative authority of Congress than is 
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87 See Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212 (1845); United States v. Cantril, 8 U.S. 167 (1807); United 
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89 Ibid., 1267. 
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become an established forum for raising constitutional issues and imposing constitutional 
limitations on federal legislation.90  
 Although the judicial role in the nineteenth century cannot explain why antislavery 
judges upheld the fugitive act, it may explain why they claimed that they were helpless to rule 
against it.  Much more than today, the judicial function was perceived to be one of an oracle of 
the law, where judges identified timeless and immutable legal principles and applied them to 
specific cases.91  Under this view, a judge could not be held morally responsible for his 
decisions, as he merely found rather than made the law.  As modern legal thought has made 
clear, however, judges do have discretion when legal issues are ambiguous.  Their decisions are 
thus often influenced by policy preferences, even if unconsciously.  The judges’ claims that the 
positive law forced them to uphold the Fugitive Slave Act thus merely reflect the nineteenth 
century conception of the judicial role and should not be seen as particularly convincing. 
v. Respectability of Arguments Against the Fugitive Slave Act  
Even if a logical case could be made against the Fugitive Slave Act, social mores could 
have prevented a serious inquiry.92  In other words, social rather than legal factors may have 
constrained the judges.  For example, it would be unrealistic to expect an antebellum judge, even 
one strongly committed to antislavery values, to accept Lysander Spooner’s argument that the 
                                                 
90 Ibid., 1259. 
91 See G. Edward White, The American Judicial Tradition, Profiles of Leading American Judges 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 3rd ed. 2007), viii–xi; Wolfe, The Rise of Modern Judicial 
Review, 13, 40-41. 
92 See White, The American Judicial Tradition, xxv-xxvi. 
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Constitution prohibited slavery.  Given the social practices of the antebellum era, Spooner’s 
argument was simply not in the realm of available options. 
For several reasons, however, the Fugitive Slave Act was not so socially accepted that 
arguments against it could be discountenanced as unrealistic or out of touch with reality.  First, 
striking down the Fugitive Slave Act would not have been out of step with prevailing moral 
sentiment in the North.  Although most northerners accepted slavery as a fundamental American 
institution, fugitive slaves that managed to escape into the North were viewed sympathetically 
and slave catchers were generally viewed as morally corrupt profiteers.93  In fact, given the 
massive demonstrations against fugitive slave renditions such as those of Anthony Burns and 
Joshua Glover, it is clear that many northerners morally opposed the return of fugitive slaves and 
some even rejected the legal duty despite its explicit mention in the Constitution.94   
Second, the Fugitive Slave Act conflicted with traditional northern legal norms.  As 
explained above, the Fugitive Slave Act denied anyone accused of being a fugitive slave even the 
most fundamental of legal protections, effectively creating a presumption of slavery in the 
North.95  The law was thus at odds with the common northern presumption that all men, 
                                                 
93 See, e.g., William M. Wiecek, The Sources of Antislavery Constitutionalism in America, 
1760-1848 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), 197. 
94 See, e.g., Campbell, The Slave Catchers, 49. 
95 See Fehrenbacher, Slaveholding Republic, 231, 244. 
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regardless of race, were free.96  Moreover, the act flew in the face of decades of state legislation 
designed, at least in part, to protect free blacks from kidnapping.97  Many Northerners had long 
been angered over Southern kidnapping of free black residents.98  An antislavery judge that 
demanded some protection for free blacks in the North would only have been extending existing 
northern legal principles.99 
Third, in the early 1850s, when the judges first considered the law, the Fugitive Slave Act 
was not so politically popular as to be beyond examination.  The act passed only because of 
strong southern support--thirty-one Northerners voted for the act in the House while seventy-six 
voted against it.100  After the act’s passage, many prominent northerners, comprising a majority 
                                                 
96 While most blacks in the North were free, and courts typically presumed them to be so, see, 
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Black Laws: Race and the Legal Process in Early Ohio (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2005), 
164. 
98 See, Middleton, The Black Laws, 175, 211-13. 
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in some geographical areas, violently condemned the law.101  And though the deeply unpopular 
abolitionists formed the core of this opposition, many mainstream political leaders and 
newspapers also took part.102  In fact, a large number of northern Whigs opposed the law, 
including a majority of Whigs from states such as Ohio and New York.103  Daniel Webster, one 
of the most powerful politicians in the country, devastated his reputation in the North, and 
especially in his home state of Massachusetts, by endorsing the law.104   
Due to the influence of many northern politicians, urban businessmen, and clergymen, 
however, most northerners probably found the law’s harsh provisions distasteful but ultimately 
acquiesced in order to avoid conflict with the South.105  Political leaders such as Daniel Webster 
argued that support for the Fugitive Slave Act would “rebuk[e] that spirit of faction and 
disunion” that imperiled the country, and Congress even passed a resolution declaring the 
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104 See, e.g., Maurice G. Baxter, One and Inseparable: Daniel Webster and the Union 
(Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1984), 427, 484; Robert V. Remini, Daniel Webster: The Man and 
His Time (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1997), 697, 706-07. 
105 Campbell, The Slave Catchers, 49, 66.  See also, e.g. “The Fugitive Slave Case,” The 
Cincinnati Daily Times (Aug. 18, 1853) (“The feeling among our citizens generally, is that in 
such cases the law should be obeyed, however much the system of slavery is to be deprecated.”). 
  34 
Compromise measures to be a final adjustment of sectional issues.106  Most northern ministers 
also supported the law, and many urged their congregations to abide by its terms for the sake of 
the Union.107  Moreover, urban businessmen, many of whom disapproved of slavery and the 
terms of the fugitive act, organized mass Union meetings and otherwise exerted their influence in 
favor of the act out of fear that disobedience to the law could disrupt commercial ties with the 
South.108   
Public opinion in the North was thus not overwhelmingly supportive of the fugitive act; 
instead, many opposed the law while others found it distasteful and accepted it only as a 
necessary expedient to reduce the risk of disunion.  A judge who ruled against the law thus 
would not have been completely out of step with northern public opinion.  In fact, in 
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Massachusetts and Ohio, the states in which the judges examined in this paper lived, they likely 
would have received substantial mainstream political support. 
In sum, while a majority of northerners accepted the law, many found it to be immoral, 
against traditional legal principles, and acceptable only because they thought it was necessary to 
appease the South.  It thus seems that, unlike a ruling against the institution of slavery, striking 
down the fugitive act would not have been socially untenable in the North.  The only social 
obstacle to such a ruling was thus the judges’ own inclinations, which of course were influenced 
by the same forces that shaped public opinion, including the political reality that a failure to 
enforce the fugitive act would have threatened the Union. 
vi. State Court Rulings Against the Fugitive Acts 
 The conclusion that prominent antislavery judges had the ability to rule against the 
Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 is reinforced by the fact that several relatively obscure state judges 
used traditional legal principles to rule against it.  In 1854, the Wisconsin Supreme Court ruled 
that the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 was unconstitutional and released a federal prisoner accused 
of rescuing a fugitive slave.109  Writing for the court, Chief Justice Edward V. Whiton held that 
the fugitive act violated the right to a trial by jury and gave judicial powers to commissioners in 
violation of Article III.110  In a concurring opinion, Judge Abraham D. Smith also argued that 
Congress lacked power to legislate under the Fugitive Slave Clause.111  In addition, two 
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dissenting Ohio Supreme Court judges adopted each of the arguments used by the Wisconsin 
judges in the 1859 case of Ex parte Bushnell.112 
 Some commentators have incorrectly argued that the Wisconsin and Ohio judges 
ruled against the Fugitive Slave Act only by ignoring established legal doctrine.113  This 
is because Judge Smith and the Ohio dissenters justified their decisions with a states’ 
rights view of federalism that permitted state courts to reach constitutional decisions 
independently of federal precedent.114  However, although this states’ rights doctrine did 
violate established legal principles, it was not directly related to the courts’ rulings 
against the fugitive act or even mentioned in Chief Justice Whiton’s opinion for the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court.  In fact, Chief Justice Whiton went to great lengths to 
distinguish his opinion from Prigg and other fugitive slave precedents.115   
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115 Chief Justice Whiton asserted that, because of the differences between the fugitive acts, “[i]t 
can hardly be claimed, we think, that any adjudication upon the act of 1793 could decide all the 
questions involved in the act of 1850.”  In re Booth, 29.  He argued that, in Prigg, “nothing was 
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 Judge Smith and the Ohio dissenters likely employed states’ rights only because, 
by the time they encountered the Fugitive Slave Act, it was clear that the Supreme Court 
would probably uphold it.116  The state judges thus probably used states’ rights as a way 
to justify their decisions despite nearly certain reversal.117  Contrary to the traditional 
account, these judges were thus forced to violate formal legal principles only because 
prominent antislavery judges like Justice McLean had already chosen to uphold the act.  
The actions of these state court judges thus demonstrate that an antislavery judge could 
have ruled against the Fugitive Slave Act if he had the desire to do so. 
III. Inclination of the Antislavery Judges 
No prominent antislavery judge that encountered the Fugitive Slave Act as a matter of 
first impression, however, had the inclination to strike it down.  The two most significant 
antislavery jurists of the 1850s, Justice John McLean and Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw of the 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, probably personally supported the act as a matter of 
                                                 
said in relation to the powers of commissioners, for those officers did not exist at the time when 
the act of congress was passed,” and “the question of trial by jury to determine the facts of the 
case, was not raised by the record and was not discussed by the court in giving its opinion.”  Ibid. 
116 Justices McLean, Grier, and Nelson had already upheld the law while riding circuit, and 
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  38 
public policy.118  In fact, after upholding the act, they even went out of their way to remand 
fugitives to slavery.  Given the political context of the era, the positions of their respective 
political parties, and their own statements, it is likely that the justices’ decisions were influenced 
by a belief that the act’s enforcement was necessary in order to preserve the Union.119   
i. Justice John McLean 
                                                 
118 Although Justice Joseph Story is perhaps the most prominent antislavery jurist in American 
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Story’s Judicial Nationalism,” Sup. Court Rev. (1994): 247-294. 
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that the judges’ statements about the risk of disunion were merely an “elevation of the formal 
stakes.”  He claims that antislavery judges, after having already decided to uphold the act 
because of legal considerations, made their decisions easier to live with by unconsciously 
exaggerating the importance of the formal values at stake.  See Cover, Justice Accused, 238-56.  
In contrast, this paper argues that these statements instead reveal a powerful influence on the 
judges’ decisions. 
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There is no question that John McLean, who served as an Associate Justice of the 
Supreme Court from 1830 to 1861, was morally opposed to slavery.120  Before being appointed 
to the Supreme Court in 1830, and while not a wealthy man, he purchased and freed several 
slaves with his personal funds.121  Like many northerners, he was also an ardent opponent of 
slavery’s expansion in the territories.122  Salmon P. Chase, an important antislavery leader in the 
antebellum era, called McLean “the most reliable man, on the slavery question, now prominent 
in either party.”123 
McLean’s judicial decisions also reveal his antislavery credentials.  In Ohio v. Carneal, 
while serving as a Justice of the Ohio Supreme Court in 1817, McLean called slavery “an 
infringement upon the sacred rights of man” and ruled that any slave whose labor was used for 
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profit in Ohio was made free under the Ohio Constitution.124  McLean is perhaps best known for 
his dissent in Dred Scott v. Sanford, where he argued that blacks could be United States citizens 
and Congress could ban slavery in the territories.125 
McLean also issued the sole dissent in Prigg, where he argued that Pennsylvania’s 
personal liberty law was a valid inquiry into whether the person claimed was in fact a fugitive 
slave.126  He argued that there was “no conflict between the law of the state and the law of 
congress” because the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 reached only fugitive slaves while the personal 
liberty law applied to free blacks.127  He reasoned that since all people in Pennsylvania were 
presumed to be free, the slave owner had no legal rights under the Fugitive Slave Clause or 
Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 until he had proven that the alleged fugitive was in fact a slave using 
the proper legal procedures.128   
After his dissent in Prigg, however, McLean issued a number of opinions while riding 
circuit on a federal appellate court that upheld the fugitive slave acts and returned fugitive slaves 
                                                 
124 Ohio Unreported Judicial Decisions Prior to 1823, ed. Ervin H. Pollack (Indianapolis, IN: 
Allen Smith Company, 1952), 133, 135, 140-41.  McLean expressly reserved the issues of slaves 
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125 Dred Scott, 529 (McLean, dissenting). 
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to bondage.  Most of these cases were decided under the old Fugitive Slave Act of 1793,129 
which had been upheld in Prigg.  As the conventional view points out, McLean was obligated to 
follow Prigg as binding precedent and thus had no discretion to rule against the Fugitive Slave 
Act of 1793.    
McLean also comprehensively upheld the constitutionality of the Fugitive Slave Act of 
1850 while riding circuit in Miller v. McQuerry.130  Prominent antislavery lawyers John Jolliffe 
and James Birney raised each major argument discussed above while representing the alleged 
fugitive.131  Not only did McLean hold that Prigg precluded many of these arguments, such as 
the lack of congressional power and the right to a trial by jury, but he also defended the Court’s 
reasoning.132  McLean also adopted the standard response to the arguments against the new role 
of federal commissioners discussed above: he argued that commissioners were not Article III 
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judges because they rendered only preliminary determinations, and the variable fee was merely 
compensation for the extra work required to remand fugitives.133 
The traditional explanation for this decision is that legal considerations forced McLean to 
uphold the act despite his personal views.134  Although McLean did appeal to positivism to 
defend his opinion,135 as explained above, legal factors such as precedent did not compel a 
proslavery ruling.  Based on the language used in his opinions, his personal correspondence, his 
eagerness to rule in favor of southern claimants, and his political affiliations, McLean was 
probably inclined to uphold the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 because he believed strict 
enforcement was necessary to preserve the Union. 
Throughout his fugitive slave opinions, McLean extolled the value of the Union and 
suggested that observance of the Fugitive Slave Act was essential to its preservation.  For 
example, in Miller, McLean explained that the framers “understood the federal and state powers 
too well, not to know that without some effective [federal] provision on this subject, the 
superstructure which they were about to rear would soon be overthrown.”136  Moreover, while 
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urging the jury to follow the provisions of the Fugitive Slave Act in Ray v. Donnell, McLean 
declared: “The constitution has made us one people, a nation--a great nation; . . . if we shall 
maintain its principles in the same spirit which led to its formation, our country will be advanced 
to a height of prosperity . . . .  If the guarantees of this fundamental law [including the Fugitive 
Slave Clause] be disregarded, all our hopes for the future, as regards the prosperity, the 
greatness, and the glory of our country must perish.”137  Other cases contain similar appeals to 
the value of the Union and warn of the risk of its disruption posed by northerners who 
disregarded the duty to return fugitive slaves.138   
McLean’s view of the importance of the fugitive clause at the constitutional convention 
lends further insight into his fugitive slave decisions.  McLean repeatedly asserted in his 
opinions that “without a provision on the subject [of fugitive slaves] no constitution could have 
been adopted.”139  This was a common belief among nineteenth century jurists.140  In reality, 
however, the fugitive clause was not an important provision at the convention--it was adopted 
with little debate, as part of no constitutional deal, and with no serious opposition.141  The 
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framers were either too tired to debate the issue or simply did not anticipate its importance.142  
McLean and other antebellum jurists likely adopted such a clear historical error only because 
they understood that the clause had become an essential term of the Union in 1850.143 
McLean’s personal letters are also revealing.  In one particularly telling letter written in 
November of 1850, McLean responded to a seemingly hostile minister who argued that returning 
fugitive slaves to their masters was immoral. 144  McLean defended the morality of the new 
Fugitive Slave Act by arguing that remanding fugitive slaves was necessary to preserve the 
Union.145  He started with the familiar refrain that “the constitution could not be adopted without 
the clause requiring the surrender of fugitives from labor. . . . Had this great measure failed, the 
fruits of the revolution would have been lost.”  Calling the Constitution “the parent of many 
blessings to our country,” he asked, “[i]f we disregard its provisions, how can we of the free 
states require obedience to it from the South[?]”  He finally stated that he would not object to “a 
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modification of  [the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850’s] objectionable provisions which shall not 
defeat or impair efficiency in carrying out the provisions of the constitution.  [However,] [i]f this 
object shall not be attained, I have no doubt that the ruin of our government and country will 
follow.”  It thus appears that McLean felt that an effective fugitive law was essential to 
preserving peace and Union, which outweighed the harm of returning fugitives to slavery. 
It is important to stress that, unlike in his judicial opinions, McLean was arguing in moral 
rather than legal terms in this letter.  Although McLean did appeal to positivism, such as 
claiming that “enforcement of th[e] ‘higher law’ caused more wars and bloodshed in the world, 
than all other causes united,” it is hard to view this statement as motivating his conclusion.  Not 
only did McLean’s letter offer no legal argument for the constitutionality of the Fugitive Slave 
Act, but he also asserted that, at the time he wrote the letter, he had “scarcely read” the act.  It is 
telling that he was predisposed to support the act before he had even bothered to read its 
provisions.146  Thus, while he occasionally appealed to the values of legal positivism, McLean’s 
overriding argument was that adherence to the new fugitive act was desirable as a matter of 
policy. 
The claim that McLean personally supported enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Act is 
reinforced by the fact that he stretched to enforce its provisions even when not required to do so 
by law.  In Norris v. Newton, a fugitive slave case in which McLean ruled while riding circuit in 
1850, John Norris, a Kentucky slave owner, seized Lucy Powell and her three sons as fugitive 
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slaves without the use of legal process.147  While traveling near South Bend, Indiana, a sheriff, 
accompanied by a large group of armed men, served Norris with a writ of habeas corpus and, 
after a brief armed standoff, escorted him to a state court in South Bend.  In his return of the writ, 
Norris justified his detention of the Powells by alleging that he held them as his fugitive slaves.  
The Powells excepted to the sufficiency of Norris’ return---meaning that they claimed that 
Norris’ return, even if taken as true, did not justify their detention---on the grounds that a master 
could only remove his fugitives after taking them before a judge or magistrate and obtaining a 
certificate of removal as specified in the Fugitive Slave Act.148 
Apparently unaware of the private right of recaption established in Prigg, the state judge 
ruled in favor of the Powells.  Upon hearing this ruling, Norris and his companions grabbed the 
Powells, drew their weapons, warned the crowd in the courthouse not to approach, and arrested 
the Powells under Indiana’s personal liberty law.  The state judge subsequently discharged the 
Powells on the grounds that Prigg invalidated Indiana’s personal liberty law, and a crowd 
escorted them out of the city.  Rather than pursue the Powells or attempt to obtain a certificate of 
removal, Norris sued the Powells’ attorney and several others in federal court for the loss of his 
slaves.149   
In his charge to the jury, McLean bended both the law and the facts to ensure that the jury 
imposed severe financial penalties on the citizens of South Bend who had aided the Powells.150  
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In a questionable statement of the law, McLean instructed the jury that “the discharge of the 
fugitives by the judge was void, and, consequently, can give no protection to those who acted 
under it.”151  McLean reached this conclusion by reasoning that, in failing to deny Norris’ claim 
of ownership in their exception to the sufficiency of Norris’s return of the writ, the Powells had 
admitted to being his slaves.  Since a master has the right to arrest and hold his slaves, the state 
judge “could exercise no further jurisdiction in this case.”152  McLean thus ultimately concluded 
that any person who “aided, by words or actions, the movement which resulted in the escape of 
the fugitives” was liable even if they were merely enforcing the orders of the state court. 
The state court’s orders, however, at least arguably should have shielded the defendants 
from liability.  The weight of nineteenth century legal authority seems to indicate that an order 
from a court of valid subject matter and personal jurisdiction was a conclusive defense to any 
suit arising from its enforcement, even if the decision was later found to be erroneous.153  
Although McLean couched his ruling in terms of jurisdiction, the Powells’ supposed admission 
went to the merits of the case rather than the court’s power to adjudicate the dispute.  McLean 
actually admitted that the court had jurisdiction by stating that the state judge had the power to 
issue the writ of habeas corpus and discharge the prisoners if the master presented insufficient 
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proof.154  The Powells’ admission perhaps should have immediately resolved the case in Norris’ 
favor, but it is hard to see how it could have defeated the state court’s power to render a 
judgment.  Moreover, Indiana law was not even clear on the issue of whether a fact not refuted in 
an exception to a return of habeas corpus should be treated as an admission.155  Consequently, 
McLean could have instructed the jury that the state court’s orders, though erroneous, served as a 
complete defense.   
McLean also presented a critical factual issue in a biased manner.  McLean went out of 
his way to discredit the Powells’ claim to freedom based on principles of interstate comity.  By 
the 1850s it was established law in Kentucky, Norris’s home state, that when a master permitted 
his slave to enter a Free State he was liberated under its laws.156  Credible evidence was 
presented at trial that Norris had allowed the Powells to raise their own crops and sell them in 
Indiana, including admissions made by Norris to citizens of South Bend in order to show that he 
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was a kind master.157  While commenting on the evidence, however, McLean made it clear that 
he thought the evidence was insufficient to support the Powells’ claim. 158 
In a mixed issue of law and fact, McLean also failed to allow the jury to consider whether 
Norris’ custody of the Powells complied with the requirements of Prigg.  Under Prigg, a slave 
owner could reclaim a fugitive without the aid of legal process only if done “without any breach 
of the peace or any illegal violence.”159  Instead of instructing the jury on this issue, McLean 
accepted Norris’s assertion that the Powells were willing to peacefully return to slavery at face 
value despite substantial evidence to the contrary.160  Moreover, McLean completely ignored the 
armed confrontations that occurred both when Norris was initially served with the writ of habeas 
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corpus and when the judge announced his decision.  Any of these incidents perhaps could have 
been found to constitute a breach of the peace, thus negating Norris’ private right of recaption.161 
In Norris, McLean thus stretched both the law and the facts to insure that a decision was 
reached that both appeased the southern claimant and discouraged northerners from lending aid 
to fugitive slaves in the future, including legal representation.  Following the conventional view, 
one commentator concludes that McLean “did not choose between liberty and slavery,” but 
rather was forced to choose between liberty and formal principles of law.162  As explained above, 
however, formal principles of law favored freedom at least as much as slavery. In fact, McLean 
seems to have distorted formal legal principles in order to rule in favor of the southern claimant.  
McLean’s decision thus must have been influenced by non-legal considerations.  Given his 
opposition to slavery, McLean likely took into consideration the political consequences of a 
Supreme Court Justice ruling against the southern claimant. 
McLean’s approval of the Fugitive Slave Act should not be surprising given his political 
affiliations.  Referred to as a “Politician on the Supreme Court” by his biographer, McLean 
maintained presidential ambitions throughout his life.163  In 1848 McLean identified with the 
Whig Party and strongly desired the Whig presidential nomination.164  The Whig Party was split 
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on opinion regarding the Fugitive Slave Act in the early 1850s, but the majority favored 
supporting it to maintain sectional unity.165  When the Republican Party formed in the mid 
1850s, McLean joined its ranks and received strong conservative support for the Republican 
presidential nomination in 1856.166  And although public opinion in the North became much 
more hostile to the Fugitive Slave Act after the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act in 1854,167 
the national Republican Party never officially called for its nullification or repeal.  In fact, 
Lincoln, himself a moderate Republican, pledged to see it enforced.168  McLean’s desire to see 
the Fugitive Slave Act enforced because of considerations of Union thus fit well with the 
moderate elements of the political parties that he hoped to lead. 
There is one piece of evidence, though, that seems to support the traditional view that 
McLean upheld the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 for legal reasons:  his dissent in Prigg when the 
Supreme Court first interpreted the Fugitive Slave Clause.  It could be claimed that McLean’s 
dissent demonstrates that he opposed the fugitive act as a matter of first impression but was 
forced to later uphold the act because of stare decisis.169  There are at least two reasons to think, 
however, that McLean may have been influenced by policy considerations despite his dissent in 
Prigg. 
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First, it is important to recognize the limited nature of McLean’s dissent.  At no point did 
he question the constitutionality of the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793; instead, he merely refused to 
recognize a master’s right to seize an alleged fugitive without legal process in violation of a state 
law designed to prevent kidnapping.170  In fact, McLean rejected one of the most persuasive 
arguments against the fugitive slave acts by agreeing with the Court that Congress was given 
power to legislate under the Fugitive Slave Clause.171  Moreover, while Story had cast doubt on 
whether Congress could enlist state officers to enforce the act, McLean unambiguously stated 
that “in the case of fugitives from labor and from justice, they have the power to do so.”172  If 
McLean’s position on the enlistment issue had prevailed, the North’s personal liberty laws, 
which withdrew state assistance in the rendition process, would have been invalidated.  Because 
McLean’s dissent was so limited, his subsequent support for the fugitive act of 1850 was not a 
major change in opinion.   
Second, McLean’s dissent in Prigg, written in 1842, was written in a very different 
political context than his later fugitive slave opinions.  Sectional tensions had reached a new 
height in 1850, and the fugitive slave issue was a major point of contention.  Because the South 
threatened disunion in the Georgia Platform if the new fugitive act was not strictly enforced, 
McLean was probably much more impressed with the political significance of the issue in the 
early 1850s.  As a prominent public official who spent time in the nation’s capital and had strong 
political ambitions, McLean was surely well aware of this political reality.  McLean even 
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received a letter from an acquaintance from Charleston, South Carolina, who warned that “if the 
agitation is continued, the days of the republic are numbered.” 173  In response, McLean asserted 
that he had “observed with great anxiety, the rise in progress of this agitation [on slavery].”174   
ii. Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw 
Lemuel Shaw, who served as the Chief Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts from 1830 to 1860, is one of the most famous and influential state judges in 
American history.175  His influence on American slavery jurisprudence was no exception.   In the 
case of Commonwealth v. Aves, Shaw, setting an antislavery precedent that would be adopted 
throughout much of the North, ruled that slaves voluntarily brought into Massachusetts “for any 
temporary purpose of business or pleasure” were entitled to their freedom.176  He reasoned that 
slavery, “being contrary to natural right, and effected by local law, is dependant upon such local 
law for its existence and efficacy.”177  His slavery jurisprudence was shaped by his belief that 
                                                 
173  Donald Mackintosh, Letter to John McLean, Feb. 8, 1850, John McLean Papers, Folder 17, 
University of Virginia Library, Charlottesville, Virginia. 
174  John McLean, Letter to Donald Mackintosh, Nov. 10, 1850, John McLean Papers, Folder 17, 
University of Virginia Library, Charlottesville, Virginia. 
175 See Leonard W. Levy, The Law of the Commonwealth and Chief Justice Shaw (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1957); Elijah Adlow, The Genius of Lemuel Shaw: Expounder of the 
Common Law (Boston: Massachusetts Bar Association, 1962). 
176 35 Mass. 193 (1836), 207, 217. 
177 Ibid., 217. 
  54 
slavery was “utterly irreconcilable with any notions of natural justice” and “an evil of great 
magnitude.”178 
Though Shaw was an avowed opponent of slavery, he consistently upheld the provisions 
of the fugitive slave acts and returned fugitives to bondage.179  According to his biographer, 
Leonard Levy, “Shaw felt duty bound to enforce the Constitution as law regardless of whatever 
moral twinges he may have experienced” and regarded the return of runaways as a “legal 
necessity.”180  Shaw’s explanation of his own decisions thus conforms to the conventional 
account of a judge forced to uphold proslavery legislation in order to be faithful to his judicial 
role. 
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Congress had power to pass legislation on the subject of fugitive slaves and that the power given 
to commissioners did not violate Article III of the Constitution. 
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However, as Levy explains: “There exists no statement from Shaw that he, like Webster, 
Choate, and Curtis, approved of the Fugitive Slave Law as an expedient to cement sectional 
differences that menaced the Union; yet there is nothing in the cast of the man’s mind, 
temperament, or associations suggesting that his judicial obligation to enforce Congressional law 
necessarily conflicted with his personal opinions.”181  In fact, there is much reason to think that 
Shaw personally approved of the Fugitive Slave Act as a matter of public policy.   
Shaw’s opinion in Sims’ Case, in which he upheld the constitutionality of the 
Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 against an exhaustive attack by Robert Rantoul, is 
instructive.182  Rather than merely justifying his decision with legal positivism and 
expressing his regret at being forced to uphold the act, he defended the country’s policy 
regarding fugitive slaves as necessary to preserve the Union.  Shaw explained:  “The 
constitution, therefore, is not responsible for the origin or continuance of slavery.  The 
provision it contains [the Fugitive Slave Clause] was the best adjustment which could be 
made of conflicting rights and claims, and was absolutely necessary to effect what may 
now be considered as the general pacification, by which harmony and peace should take 
the place of violence and war.”183 
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Unpacking this passage reveals three of Shaw’s fundamental beliefs on fugitive 
slaves.  First, Shaw, like most prominent jurists of the antebellum era, believed that the 
fugitive clause was “absolutely necessary” for the formation of the Union.  As explained 
above, it is likely that this historical error was reinforced, and perhaps motivated, by an 
awareness that the fate of the Union did depend on enforcement of the fugitive clause in 
1850.184  Second, he reveals a high valuation of the Union in asserting that it was 
necessary to avoid “violence and war” between the states.   
Third, by arguing that the fugitive clause was the “best adjustment which could be 
made” between the interests of the Free and Slave States, Shaw seems to be asserting 
that, given the existence of slavery at the time of the founding, the fugitive clause was a 
normatively desirable provision at that time.  Given the rising sectional tensions in the 
1850s that made “violence and war” between the states much more likely than in the 
eighteenth century, there is little reason to believe that Shaw would have changed his 
mind about the desirability of the Fugitive Slave Clause. Although support for the 
Fugitive Slave Clause is not necessarily the same as support for the Fugitive Slave Act of 
1850, it does reveal that Shaw believed that the duty to return fugitive slaves was a 
necessary compromise with the South. 
 Shaw’s extra-judicial statements also support the conclusion that he approved of 
the Fugitive Slave Act as a matter of policy.  Although Shaw’s personal papers reveal no 
extra-judicial statement on the issue during his service as a judge, an article in the North 
American Review, published before his term on the court, lends rare insight into Shaw’s 
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moderate antislavery viewpoint.  In this article, Shaw asserted that “[s]lavery, though a 
great and acknowledged evil, must be regarded, to a certain extent, as a necessary one, 
too deeply interwoven into the texture of society to be wholly or speedily eradicated.”185  
He thus argued against immediate abolition and counseled that the government should 
instead focus on “attainable good” and “not blindly overlook the only practicable means 
of arriving at it.”186  Although he did not directly address the issue of fugitive slaves, 
from these passages it is clear that Shaw favored a moderate antislavery approach that 
would not threaten the established order.  It is thus reasonable to infer that, as a matter of 
policy, he might have supported the duty to return fugitive slaves as a necessary 
condition of Union with the slave states, just as he viewed slavery itself as a necessary 
institution in the South to prevent violence and social disruption. 
Soon after Shaw retired from the court, at the height of the secession crisis in 
1860, he signed an appeal to the people of Massachusetts, asking that they repeal the 
state’s personal liberty law.  Shaw and his co-signers urged repeal of the law and 
compliance with the Fugitive Slave Act, claiming that they acted “under [their] own love 
of right ; under [their]own sense of the sacredness of compacts ;  [and] under [their] own 
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conviction of the inestimable importance of social order and domestic peace . . . .”187  
Shaw thus advocated adherence to the Fugitive Slave Act as a matter of policy in order to 
stop the threat of southern secession.  It is reasonable to infer that he may have supported 
the act during the turbulent 1850s for the same reason. 
 Moreover, like McLean, Shaw not only upheld the Fugitive Slave Act on 
constitutional grounds, but he also stretched to reach proslavery results in specific 
fugitive cases.  In 1851, just months after the passage of the Fugitive Slave Act, federal 
officials arrested Frederick Jenkins, also known as Shadrach, as a fugitive slave in 
Boston, a city that had yet to remand a single fugitive slave to the South.  Just as the 
southern claimant wished to use this as a test case for enforcement of the Fugitive Slave 
Act, Richard Henry Dana and other prominent antislavery lawyers in Boston hoped to use 
it as a test case for the act’s constitutionality.188  After Shadrach was placed in federal 
custody at the Boston courthouse, Dana drafted writs of habeas corpus and de homine 
replegiando and personally delivered them to Chief Justice Shaw. 
 Shaw denied Dana’s attempt to challenge the act by insisting on unnecessarily 
strict adherence to procedural formalities.  According to Dana, Shaw at first refused to act 
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on the writs because the petition was not personally signed by Shadrach.189  After Dana 
pointed out that the statute did not require a signature, Shaw protested that there was no 
evidence that the petition had been approved by Shadrach.190  After refusing to tell Dana 
what proof of authority was required, Shaw next denied the writs because the petition 
showed “that the man is in legal custody of a United States marshal.”191  To this, Dana 
correctly replied that the government has the burden of proving legal detention, and thus 
the fact of custody could not defeat the writs.  Finally, Shaw denied the writs because 
“the petition should contain a copy of the warrant, or state that a copy had been applied 
for and could not be had.”192  Shortly after Shaw’s refusal to grant the writs, Shadrach 
was forcibly rescued from the marshals’ custody and escaped to the North, rendering the 
case moot. 
 Shaw’s actions indicate that he may have preferred to deny Shadrach’s claim to 
freedom rather than antagonize sectional relations.  It is, of course, possible that Shaw 
simply disliked Dana for some unrelated reason or that Dana inaccurately reported the 
encounter.  However, Shaw’s shifting excuses, inaccurate and prejudicial statements of 
law, and strict insistence on procedural formalities all provide at least some evidence that 
                                                 
189 Ibid., 180; 2 The Journal of Richard Henry Dana, Jr., Robert F. Lucid, ed. (Cambridge: The 
Belknap Press of the Harvard University Press, 1968), 411. 
190 Adams, Richard Henry Dana, 181; Lucid, Journal of Richard Henry Dana, 411. 
191 Adams, Richard Henry Dana, 181; Lucid, Journal of Richard Henry Dana, 411. 
192 Adams, Richard Henry Dana, 181; Lucid, Journal of Richard Henry Dana, 411. 
  60 
the Chief Justice may not have been inclined to question the fugitive’s rendition.193  
Judges often use procedural ruling to reach results with which they agree.194  By going 
beyond the requirements of the law to rule against Shadrach, Shaw may have denied at 
least one fugitive’s claim to freedom for non-legal reasons. 
Though obviously a biased party, Dana summed up his encounter with Shaw by 
writing: 
  The conduct of the Chief Justice, his evident disinclination to act, the 
frivolous nature of his objections, and his insulting manner to me, have troubled 
me more than any other manifestation.  It shows how deeply seated, so as to 
effect, unconsciously I doubt not, good men like him, is this selfish hunkerism of 
the property interest on the slave question. 
. . . . 
 . . . Judge Metcalf was present at my interview with Judge Shaw, and expressed 
himself very much disturbed by the conduct of the chief.195 
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 As a conservative or ‘Cotton’ Whig and strong supporter of Daniel Webster,196 
Shaw’s support for the Fugitive Slave Act should come as no surprise.  Although 
Webster condemned slavery as a moral and political evil, he was above all a champion of 
the Union.  In his famous Seventh of March speech on the Compromise of 1850, in which 
he claimed that his “sole motive” was “the preservation of the Union,”197 Webster 
emerged as the preeminent champion of the Fugitive Slave Act in the North.  He asserted 
that, on the subject of fugitive slaves, “as a question of morals and a question of 
conscience, . . . the South is right, and the North is wrong.”198  He thus pledged “to 
support, with all its provisions, to the fullest extent” the Fugitive Slave Act.199  Moreover, 
Whig support for the Fugitive Slave Act in Boston was not limited to politicians, as 
Supreme Court Justice Benjamin R. Curtis, also a Bostonian Cotton Whig and strong 
supporter of Webster, publicly defended both the constitutionality and morality of the 
Fugitive Slave Act.200  
IV. Conclusion 
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The prevailing view of the antislavery judge should be reconsidered.  The 
conventional wisdom--that the law forced antislavery judges to uphold proslavery 
positive law or abandon their judicial role--is analytically incomplete.  Although the 
traditional view holds true for many lower court trial judges, it fails to fully explain the 
motivation behind those antislavery judges who ruled as a matter of first impression.  At 
least with regard to the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, the most important and commonly 
invoked proslavery law in the North, legal factors did not at first dictate a proslavery 
result.  Rather than limit these judges’ discretion, the judicial role forced them into an 
anguishing dilemma.  In their constitutional jurisprudence, antislavery judges were likely 
influenced to rule against the plight of fugitive slaves by a fear that ruling against the 
fugitive act could result in disunion and sectional conflict. 
The conventional account also finds little support in slavery jurisprudence beyond 
the fugitive slave issue.  Instead of following the proslavery majority in Dred Scott, 
Justices McLean and Curtis ruled that Congress could prohibit slavery in the territories 
and that blacks could be United States citizens.  Additionally, as explained above, Shaw 
and McLean rescinded comity with the South on issues involving slaves voluntarily 
brought into the Free States by their masters.  It is likely no accident that these 
antislavery rulings were applauded by most conservative Republicans and were not 
widely perceived to threaten sectional stability.  In their slavery jurisprudence, prominent 
antislavery judges, like moderate Republican politicians, thus were willing to embrace 
antislavery arguments that would have contained slavery in the South; however, they fell 
short of accepting those that they feared would threaten the Union. 
